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1. Introduction
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) accounts for 45% of the total EU budget. Will its
extension to Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) break the EU budget? The 10
CEECs currently negotiating for membership would increase the number of farmers by 120%
and would increase the area under cultivation by 42%. It is thus widely expected that
enlargement will dramatically increase the cost of the CAP.
Early studies of the cost of extending the CAP to the CEECs arrived at very large numbers.
But most of these studies pre-dated the 1999 Berlin Council and the Agenda 2000 reforms
agreed there. These early budgetary impact estimations are now considered inaccurate.
The discussion here is based on a set of more recent studies, which have incorporated the
actual Agenda 2000 reforms and adjusted expectations on the number of countries and timing
of enlargement, and are considered to be more accurate in their predictions.  More
specifically, the studies are produced by DIW (Berlin/Göttingen), IBO/LEI (The Hague) and
IAMO (Halle).
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2. Agricultural expenditures in the EU budget
In 2000, agricultural expenditures accounted for €40.5 billion, which represents 45% of the
total EU budget. There are three categories of expenditures on agriculture (see Table 1), as
follows.
•  Market interventions are expenditures to support EU farm prices through intervention
purchases, storage, and export subsidies. In 2000, the EU-15 spent €10.6 billion on
agricultural market support, i.e. 12% of the total EU budget.
                                                                
* Associate Senior Research Fellow, CEPS and Professor of Economics at the University of Leuven.
1  IBO/LEI study: “The Financing of the Common Agricultural Policy after Enlargement of the
European Union” Interdepartmental Policy Study (IBO), unpublished document, The Hague, The
Netherlands. Most of the budgetary estimates in the IBO report are based on  Silvis, H.J., van
Rijswijck, C.W.J., and A.J. de Kleijn, “EU agricultural expenditure for various accession scenarios”
Report 6.01.04, Agricultural Economics Research Institute (LEI), The Hague.
IAMO study: Frohberg, K. and G. Weber, “Ein Ausblick in die Zeit nach vollzogener Ost-
Erweiterung” Institut für Agrarentwickelung in Mittel- und Osteuropa (IAMO), Halle, Juli 2001
DIW study: Weise, C., Banse, M., Bode, W., Lippert, B., Nölle, F. And S. Tangermann,
“Reformbedarf bei den EU-Politiken im Zuge der Osterweiterung der EU”, Berlin und Göttingen”,
2001.
Estimates in a working document of the  European Parliament budget committee (European
Parliament, Committee on Budgets, “Working Document on the financial implications of EU
enlargement”, 11 April 2001) are generally consistent with the estimates presented here, since the
estimates in the working documents are also based on the IAMO and Göttingen (DIW) estimates.JOHAN F.M. SWINNEN
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•  Direct payments are subsidies per hectare or per animal. A large share of these were
introduced in the  MacSharry reform (1992) and Agenda 2000 reforms to compensate
farmers for declining market and price support (see Box 1 for details). In 2000, the EU-15
spent €25.6 billion on direct payments to farmers, i.e. almost 30% of the total EU budget.
•  Rural development expenditures (also now referred to as the “second pillar” of the CAP)
cover a variety of programs. In 2000, the EU-15 spent €4.2 billion on rural development
measures, i.e. 5% of the total EU budget.
Table 1. EU agricultural expenditures in 2000
Billion € % of agricultural
expenditure
% of EU budget
Market support 10.6 26.2 11.8
Direct payments 25.6 63.4 28.5
Rural development 4.2 10.4 4.7
TOTAL 40.5 100.0 45.0
Box 1. Direct Payments in the CAP
Direct payments include both so-called  area payments (for crops) and  headage payments  (for
livestock).
Area payments have been set by the Council at €63/tonne for cereals, oilseeds, and protein crops (so-
called COP commodities), to be applied in relationship to regional variations in yields. For example, if
region A has an average yield of 6 tonnes per hectare, then the DP for farmers in that region is €378/
ha (= €63/ha x 6).
The reference yields are fixed at sub-country regional levels. For example, the UK has five regions; in
Germany the yields are determined at the level of the Länder, and for the largest Länder even on a sub-
Länder basis.
The reference period is 1989-91, as the compensation payments were first introduced with the
MacSharry reforms, decided in 1991.
These payments are conditional upon setting aside 10% of the COP land (but which can be planted by
other crops). Small producers are exempt from this condition.
In the beef sector, per headage payments are used. Three different kinds of “beef animals” are given
payments: steers, suckler cows, and bulls; at a rate of €150-200 per animal for 2002. But the premiums
are given only once in the life of every bull and twice in the life of every steer. Estimates are that the
average payment per head of eligible animal is around €25 in 2002.
The relative shares of the expenditures over the three categories have changed dramatically
over the past decade. Figure 1 illustrates how the share of direct payments increased
substantially: from less than 10% in 1991 to close to 60% in 1997, and the share is predicted
to increase further as Agenda 2000 is fully implemented in the next years. Inversely, the
importance of market interventions in budgetary outlays has declined from over 90% in 1991
to less than 40% in 1997 and is predicted to fall to close to 20% by 2006. Rural development
expenditures only became significant after Agenda 2000, and will account for slightly more
than 10% by 2006.BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS OF ENLARGEMENT: AGRICULTURE
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Figure 1. Distribution of the EU agricultural budget (1991-2006)
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It is likely that there will be a further shift in these expenditures with the next CAP reform.
2
Market expenditures are likely to decline further, and rural development expenditures will
probably increase. The direct payments category may go either way, since some of the
payments currently in that category may be replaced by payments in the rural development
category, while new direct payments may be introduced to compensate for reductions in
market interventions.
3. The Cost of Enlargement
a) The official framework
The Financial Framework (FF) agreed in Berlin made several assumptions regarding Eastern
enlargement. The most important assumptions regarding the agricultural budget were that six
new member states would join by 2002 and that agricultural enterprises in the new member
countries would not qualify for direct income support.
3 Table 2 presents the agricultural
expenditures as they are predicted in the annex to the Conclusions of the European Council of
Berlin.
                                                                
2 See J. Swinnen, A Fischler Reform of the Common Agricultural Policy?, CEPS Working Document
No. 173, September 2001.
3 A variety of arguments have been advanced against extending the direct payments to CEEC farmers.
The one most often heard is that, unlike EU farmers, CEEC farmers will not witness a price decline
with EU accession, to the contrary even. However, economists have mostly emphasised that extending
the payments to CEEC farmers would create major distortions in the CEEC economies (see e.g.
European Economy, 1996, “The CAP and Enlargement: Economic Effects of the Compensatory
Payments”, European Commission, Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs, Reports
and Studies, no. 2, Brussels).JOHAN F.M. SWINNEN
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Table 2. Agricultural expenditures in the Financial Framework (million euro)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Agriculture (cat. 8) 1600 2030 2450 2930 3400
 - Market regulation 1034 1107 1091 1153 1223
 - Rural development 566 923 1359 1777 2177
Source: European Commission (as summarised in IBO).
Each of these three key assumptions needs to be revised. The first accession is likely to take
place in 2004 instead of 2002, and it is probable that more than six countries will join, but
only as of 2004. These two changes might offset each other.
Despite much opposition from EU-15 member countries against extending the direct
payments to CEEC farmers, all the candidate countries are united in their insistence in an
“equal” treatment of their farmers from the moment of accession, i.e. that they should get the
same subsidies as the EU-15 farmers, including direct payments. It is now widely accepted
that the initial position is no longer tenable, and that CEEC farmers will receive, at least
partially, direct payments from the moment of accession.o longer tenable, and that CEEC
farmers will receive, at least partially, direct payments from the moment of accession.
b) The most recent independent estimates
A number of independent institutes have recently published estimates of the cost of extending
the CAP to the  CEECs. Tables 3 and 4 present their estimates for 2007 and 2013-15,
respectively, all in 1999 prices. The estimates are given for when all ten CEECs enter before
2007 and when eight (CEEC-8, i.e. without Bulgaria and Romania) join in 2004-05 and
Bulgaria and Romania join after 2007.
The estimations are converging on the following numbers:
•  With CEEC-8 joining in 2004-05 total agricultural expenditures will be around € 10
million in 2007, while if all ten CEECs join before, total agricultural expenditures will be
around €14-16 million by 2007.
•  Around 60% of the expenditures go to direct payments,
4 while market expenditures and
rural development each account for around 20%.
•  According to the DIW and IBO estimates, expenditures will remain constant around €14-
15 million after 2007.   
                                                                
4 Variations in the estimates not only relate to assumptions on (uncertain) market developments but
also to assumptions on the outcomes of the accession negotiations. For example, variables such as
quota allocations, reference yields and areas for direct payments are part of the negotiation process
between the EU-15 (proposing lower levels) and the CEECs (demanding higher levels). See Box 2.BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS OF ENLARGEMENT: AGRICULTURE
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Table 3. Agriculture – Budgetary effects of enlargement in 2007 with 100% direct payments going to CEECs
(million euro)
  DIW DIW DIW DIW IBO/LEI IBO/LEI IBO/LEI IBO/LEI IAMO IAMO IAMO
  market DPs rural dev TOTAL market DPs rural dev TOTAL Exportsupport DPs DP+export
Czech -51 809 235 992 423 735 156 1,314    725
Hungary 370 1,063 346 1,780 377 1,030 269 1,676 1,090
Poland 1,739 2,870 994 5,603 878 2,551 1,193 4,622 2,525
Slovakia -68 377 136 445 117 360 143 620 322
Slovenia -64 84 38 57 61 101 45 207 111
Estonia 14 93 57 163 41 84 86 211 97
Latvia 21 216 136 373 53 122 206 381 115
Lithuania 91 427 191 718 224 307 288 819 350
Bulgaria 478 583 311 1,372 146 489 363 998 569
Romania 234 3,201 807 4,241 425 1,698 865 2,988 1,898
                       
CEEC-8 2,052 5,939 2,133 10,131 2,174 5,290 2,386 9,850 5,335
CEEC-10 2,764 9,723 3,251 15,744 2,745 7,477 3,614 13,836 848 6,953 7,802
Lux-group 2,008 4,919 1,670 8,595 1,785 4,501 1,777  551 4,037 4,548
Hels-group                 337 2,916 3,253
Share in budget exp                    
CEEC-8 0.20 0.59 0.21 1.00 0.22 0.54 0.24 1.00  
CEEC-10 0.18 0.62 0.21 1.00 0.20 0.54 0.26 1.00     
Assumptions
IAMO: 10 CEECs have entered in 2007 DIW: 10 CEECs have entered in 2007             IBO: 10 CEECs join in 2004
No CAP reform 8 CEECs enter beginning 2005 No CAP Reform
1999 prices Bulg+Rom join 2007 1999 prices
No CAP Reform
1999 pricesJOHAN F. M. SWINNEN
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Table 4. Agriculture – Budgetary effects of enlargement in 2013 with 100% direct payments
going to CEECs (million euro)
  DIW DIW DIW DIW IBO/LEI IBO/LEI IBO/LEI IBO/LEI
  market DPs rural dev TOTAL market DPs rural dev TOTAL
Czech -181 696 235 750 489 735 191 1,415
Hungary 362 932 346 1,640 539 1,030 330 1,899
Poland 1,101 2,480 994 4,575 845 2,551 1,461 4,857
Slovakia -120 326 136 342 131 360 175 666
Slovenia -73 69 38 34 79 101 55 235
Estonia -2 79 57 134 38 84 105 227
Latvia -21 230 136 345 70 122 253 445
Lithuania 5 485 191 681 184 307 353 844
Bulgaria 433 506 311 1,250 172 489 445 1,106
Romania -104 3,351 807 4,054 498 1,698 1,060 3,256
                 
CEEC-10 1,400 9,154 3,251 13,805 3,045 7,477 4,428 14,950
Share in budget exp              
CEEC-10 0.10 0.66 0.24 1.00 0.20 0.50 0.30 1.00
If we compare the estimated total agricultural expenditures with enlargement with the
Financial Framework, then one can only conclude that total agricultural expenditures will be
significantly larger than the numbers in the FF.
Interestingly the sums foreseen in the FF would be approximately enough to cover the cost of
rural development and market support. The key issue is thus extending direct payments to
CEEC farmers, which would cost an additional €6-7 billion.
Box 2. Direct Payments in the CEECs
The application of the standard formula for calculating direct payments is problematic in  CEECs
because of the absence of obvious reference periods. In fact, reference yields, and areas for direct
payments are part of the negotiation process between the EU-15 (proposing lower levels) and the
CEECs (demanding higher levels). For example, CEECs have typically insisted upon using (pre-)1989
indicators as a basis for the determination of the direct payments, while the European Commission has
argued that output and yields were biased because of the Communist system and can therefore not be
used as reference indicators. Acknowledging that the early transition years are also not good indicators
because of transition disruptions, the Commission has proposed using the most recent years as
reference periods (an assumption also used in the studies discussed here).
To illustrate the importance, consider the illustration in the table below. Average wheat yields in
Poland and Hungary in the period 1988-90 were between 15-26% higher than in 1992-94, and still 8-
28% higher than in 1998-2000. The impact on the direct payments per hectare is the same, as these are
calculated with a fixed multiplier per tonne (at €63/tonne). This illustration suggests that the impact is
very significant.
Table A. Impact of reference years on direct payments
Poland Hungary
Wheat yield DP Change Wheat yield DP Change
tonne/ha €/ha % 88-90 tonne/ha €/ha % 88-90
1988-90 3.7 237 100 5.2 332 100
1992-94 3.2 201 85 3.9 246 74
1998-2000 3.5 217 92 3.7 238 72BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS OF ENLARGEMENT: AGRICULTURE
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This does not necessarily mean that enlargement will not be possible within the FF. Accession
of the CEEC-8 in 2004 instead of 2002 reduces some of the costs and makes it easier to fit
enlargement within the Financial Framework. Moreover, the EU is considering phasing in
some of the expenditures, in particular the DPs. A proposal to do just that is contained in the
recent “Draft Common Position” published by the European Commission in February 2002.
According to this proposal, the CEECs would receive the equivalent of 25% of EU-15 direct
payments in 2004, 30% in 2005, 35% in 2006, and rising to 100% in 2013. Additional
funding for Rural Development is also included.
The budgetary implications are summarised in Table 5. The data in Table 5 show that under
this proposal, the total expenditures would fit within the FF. The total additional expenditures
for agriculture expected in 2006 would be around €3.9 billion, precisely the amount foreseen
in the FF for expenditures on agriculture.
Table 5. Budgetary implications of the February 2002 Draft Common Position
of the European Commission (million euro, 1999 prices)
2004 2005 2006
Direct payments 25% 30% 35%
Commitments - 1173 1418
Payments - 1173 1418
Market expenditures
Commitments 516 749 734
Payments 516 749 734
Rural Development
Commitments 1532 1674 1781
Payments 748 1187 1730
TOTAL
Commitments 2048 3596 3933
Payments 1264 3109 3882
Berlin amounts foreseen for
agriculture (incl. SAPARD)
Commitments 2970 3450 3920
4. Time for reform?
Yet even if the EU manages to “fit” the enlargement process in the Financial Framework
2000-06, we should not be distracted from the fact that in the absence of reform the
expenditures will in the years after 2006 run-up to numbers much beyond those used in the
1999 decision-making, and that the budgetary effects for 2013 as presented in Table 4 remain
valid.
Part of the budgetary costs can be attributed to the failure of EU decision-makers, both during
the  MacSharry reforms in 1992 and at the 1999 Berlin Council meeting, to agree on
restrictions in size and in time on the direct "compensation" payments. The implications for
the budgetary effects of enlargement are obviously significant. Yet, even if those who oppose
extending direct payments to CEECs have their way, there will be significant budgetary
effects. Those who oppose the direct payments for  CEECs (because they distort local
economies and slow restructuring) favour structural aid programmes for the CEECs to foster
sustainable development.
To get a feeling of the relative size of the subsidies, note that agricultural value-added (i.e.
GDP) in the CEEC-10 was less than €18 billion in 1999. Hence €15 billion of support from
the EU budget would amount to more than 70% of the 1999 agricultural GDP in CEEC-10.JOHAN F. M. SWINNEN
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Moreover, total support to agriculture is even higher because one has to add non-budgetary
transfers from consumers through price and trade interventions. The OECD PSE calculations
indicate that, on average for 1998-99, for the EU-15, € 67 billion were transferred to farmers
agriculture through market support (including non-budgetary transfers). A rough estimate of
the non-budgetary transfers to CEEC-10 farmers with accession would add another € 5-10
billion in addition (all in 1999 prices). In total this means that the expected transfers to CEEC
farmers in 2007 under the CAP may be larger than value added created in agricultural in those
countries.
All this suggests that a reform of the direct payments is needed.5 Reducing the budget costs
of the compensation payments can be done in three ways: first by limiting them over time
(“degressivity”); second, by limiting the amount per farm or linking them to the size of the
farm (“modulation”); or third, by having them co-financed by the member states (“co-
financing”).
The simulation results in Table 6 indicate that the introduction of  degressivity (a gradual
reduction of the DPs over time) has a major impact on expenditures. In fact, even if this
degressivity is implemented only after 2007 and over a 10-year period – to allow farmers a
long transition period – the budgetary savings achieved by introducing a degressivity system
of 10% per year after 2007 could more than offset the agricultural costs of enlargement.
Hence, degressivity even of less than 10% would cause substantial savings.
The need to reform the direct payments is even more important in the light of discussions on
the reform of the dairy and sugar sector.  Dairy and sugar policy reforms may not be
politically feasible unless farmers receive some form of compensation through payments per
head or per hectare, as was done in other sectors. Agenda 2000 already includes compensation
payments for dairy farmers to compensate for price reductions between 2005 and 2007 (5%
annually). More direct payments to compensate for further dairy or sugar reforms would
require even larger budgetary outlays, and would be easier with a reform of the direct
payment system.
The simulation results in Table 6 indicate that compensation for further dairy and sugar
reforms could increase the budget by around €2 billion in the short run, and by around €4.5
billion in the longer run. However, as the last scenario in Table 5 illustrates, the savings from
a degressive implementation of the direct payments would fully finance not only enlargement,
but also the compensation costs of dairy and sugar reforms.
                                                                
5 For a more elaborate argument on this issue, see A.  Buckwell and S. Tangermann (1999), "The
Future of Direct Payments in the Context of Eastern Enlargement", MOCT/MOST Economic Policy in
Transition Economies 9: 229-252.9
Table 6. Agriculture – Budgetary effects of enlargement under various scenarios
    2007      2015     
    Market DPs Rural dev TOTAL   Market DPs Rural dev TOTAL
Basis scenario (see Tables 3 and 4)                    
  CEEC-8 2,174 5,290 2,386 9,850  
  CEEC-10 2,745 7,477 3,614 13,836  3,045 7,477 4,428 14,950
Phasing in DPs 
a)      
  CEEC-8 2,174 4,139 2,386 8,699  
  CEEC-10 2,745 5,859 3,614 12,218  3,045 7,477 4,428 14,950
Reduction of DPs (Degressivity)
b)      
  CEEC-10 2,745 7,477 3,614 13,836 3,045 3,229 4,428 10,702
  EU-15 0 -16,056
  EU-25       13,836        -5,354
Dairy + sugar reforms 
c)      
 -- Additional effects CEEC-10 -144 1,134 0 990 -254 1,701 0 1,447
  EU-15 -539 1,490 0 951 -897 3763 0 2,866
  EU-25       1,941        4,313
Dairy + sugar reforms 
c)      
 -- Aggregate additional expenditures CEEC-10 2,601 8,611 3,614 14,826 2,791 9,178 4,428 16,397
   of enlargement and reforms EU-15 -539 1,490 0 951 -897 3763 0 2,866
  EU-25       15,777        19,263
Combined Degressivity      
 + Sugar and Dairy Reforms CEEC-10 2,601 8,611 3,614 14,826 2,791 4,930 4,428 12,149
 -- Aggregate additional effects
d) EU-15 -539 1,490 0 951 -897 3763 0 -13,190
  EU-25       15,777        -1,041
Source: IBO/LEI.
                                                                
a) DPs are phased in over the five years: by an increase of 20% annually.
b) DPs are annually reduced with 10% as of 2007.
c) Dairy reforms of 15% price reduction with 50% compensation implemented under Agenda 2000 is repeated from 2007-2009.
Sugar reforms of twice 15% price reduction with 50% compensation (as in dairy, one in 2003, one in 2007).
d) The 2015 expenditure is overestimated as degressivity of extra compensation payments for sugar and dairy is not included.